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Beuchert: Power of Florida Courts to Modify Marital Settlements

POWER OF FLORIDA COURTS TO MODIFY
MARITAL SETTLEMENTS
EDWARD AV. BEUCHERT

"

Mr. and Mrs. Estranged, in contemplation of separation and divorce, wish to settle their financial and marital rights and responsibilities. Because of the increased wealth, complexity and tax consciousness of our society, attorneys have become more greatly involved in the making of these arrangements. If the parties wish to
make a permanent settlement, the attorney must look beyond the
immediate effect of the agreement and determine to what extent it
will be specifically enforced in the future irrespective of changed
circumstances. The attorney should be conscious of what arrangements the courts feel they have the power to modify. The purpose
of this discussion is to consider what types of arrangements, whether
incorporated into the divorce decree or not, the courts will and will
not modify.
Much can be said to support the view that marital settlements
should not be forever fixed once entered into. This is especially true
when the parties desire or compromise on alimony as the method of
settling their respective rights and responsibilities. The basic function
of alimony is maintenance' and what is necessary for maintenance
depends upon the circumstances. What may be sufficient for the
wife at one time may not be adequate at a later time; what the husband may easily afford at the time of the divorce may bankrupt him
five years later.
The parties, however, may take the approach that the marriage was
an unfortunate mistake from which they wish to extricate themselves
finally and completely. They wish to forget each other and to make
an irrevocable settlement of their rights. In predicting the alterability
of any agreement, initial consideration must be given to the agreement
itself and to section 65.15 of Florida Statutes 1961 which provides:
"Whenever any husband or wife heretofore, or hereafter,
shall have entered into any agreement providing for the payments for, or in lieu of, separate support, maintenance or alimony, whether in connection with any action for divorce or
*B.A. 1958, Fordham University; LL.B. 1961, Harvard University; member of
the New York Bar.
1. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1951). This is so whether alimony is
considered as derived from the husband's duty of support during marriage, or it
is based on a policy of holding the public harmless from the necessity of support
that might otherwise exist, or even if it is to compensate the plaintiff wife for the
loss of expectancies of the marriage.
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separate maintenance, or with any voluntary property settlement, or whenever any husband has pursuant to the decree of
any court of competent jurisdiction been required to make to his
wife any such payments, and the circumstances of the parties or
the financial ability of the husband shall have been changed
since the execution of such agreement, or the rendition of such
decree, either party may apply to the circuit court of the circuit
in which the parties, or either of them, shall have resided at
the date of the execution of such agreement, or shall reside at
the date of such application, or in which such agreement shall
have been executed, or in which such decree shall have been
rendered, for an order and judgment decreasing or increasing
the amount of such separate support, maintenance or alimony,
and the court, after giving both parties an opportunity to be
heard, and to introduce evidence relevant to the issue, shall
make such order and judgment as justice and equity shall require, with due regard to the changed circumstances and the
financial ability of the husband, decreasing or increasing or confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance or alimony provided for in such agreement, or in such decree.
"Thereafter the husband shall pay and be liable to pay
the amount of separate support, maintenance or alimony directed in such order and judgment, and no other or further
amount, and such agreement, or such decree, for the purpose of
all actions or proceedings of every nature and wherever instituted, whether within or without this state, shall be deemed to
be, and shall be, modified accordingly, and it shall be unlawful
to commence, or cause to be commenced as party, or attorney,
or agent, or otherwise, in behalf of either party in any court
any action or proceeding otherwise than as herein provided, nor
shall any court have jurisdiction to entertain any action or proceeding otherwise than as herein provided to enforce the recovery of separate support, maintenance or alimony otherwise
than pursuant to such order and judgment.
"This section is declaratory of existing public policy and
the laws of this state, which is hereby affirmed and confirmed
in conformance with the provisions hereof, and it shall be the
duty of the judges of the circuit courts of this state to construe
liberally the provisions hereof in order to effect the objects and
purposes hereof and the public policy of the state as hereby
declared."
Perhaps equally appropriate is the preamble to the act which provides:
"An act authorizing the circuit courts of the state of Florida
to modify or confirm payments for, or in lieu of separate suphttps://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss4/2
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port, maintenance or alimony, in accordance with voluntary
agreements between husband and wife, or pursuant to decree
of court of competent jurisdiction, and prescribing the venue
in which application for this purpose may be instituted."
The statute in effect provides for modification of either an agreement
or a decree for, or in lieu of, alimony or support.
Although the delineation between alimony and property settlement is not always easily resolved, that resolution is often the basis
of a court's decision that it has or has not the power to modify. The
spectrum spans from pure alimony to the pure property settlement.
As a general rule it may be stated that the courts have the power to
modify awards of pure alimony when the circumstances make it
equitable to do so, but have no power to modify property settlement
agreements except as they have for any other contract. The water is
muddied by agreements including both alimony and property settlements, arrangements having characteristics of both alimony and property settlements, and collateral matters. The problem now confronting
an attorney is the extent to which he can assure his clients who
desire an unalterable agreement that the arrangements into which
they enter will be specifically enforced.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Validity of Agreements
Marital settlements in advance of divorce have not always been
favored by the law; they were thought to facilitate and promote the
procurement of a divorce and therefore violate public policy.2 The
Florida courts have receded from that position. In Miller v. Miller
3
the court stated:
"Agreements made in good faith, free from fraud, deceit or
trickery relating to alimony between husband and wife, or
the adjustment of their property rights, though made in contemplation of divorce, can or may be sustained or upheld by
the courts."

Presently agreements of this type not only are upheld but are probably favored by the courts because the divorce case is simplified and
4
the chance of future litigation is lessened.
It might have been argued at one time that an agreement forever
fixing the rights of the parties violated public policy in view of
2.
g.
4.

See Gallemore v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927).
149 Fla. 722, 726, 7 So. 2d 9, 11 (1942).
See 8 FLA. L. & P., Divorce and Alimony §90 (1958).
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the general power of the courts later to modify an award of alimony,
but that controversy too has been resolved in favor of the validity of
agreements.5 Even an agreement by the husband to continue payments after his death is binding on his representatives and cannot be
altered after his death. 6
Although it appears that separation agreements will be upheld
as any other contract in the absence of fraud, some instances peculiar to the separation agreement should be noted. Since any award
presupposes a legal marriage, a married woman that effects a second,
bigamous marriage cannot enforce an agreement against the second
husband. On the other hand, failure by the husband to make
affirmative disclosure of all his assets may not be fraudulent as to make
the agreement voidable." Also, the parental duty to a child cannot
be abrogated by a final property settlement; attempts to effect unalterable child support arrangements are usually vitiated by the
courts. 9 Moreover, provisions in a separation agreement relating to
the custody and welfare of children are always modifiable.'0
Power of Divorcing Court to Award Alimony

The first modification-type question can arise when, contrary to
a prior stipulation, the wife asks for alimony in the divorce proceeding. It should be concluded that the court can award her alimony,
any prior agreement by the wife to the contrary notwithstanding.
Section 65.08 of Florida Statutes 1961 provides:
"In every decree of divorce in a suit by the wife, the court
shall make such orders touching the maintenance, alimony and
suit money of the wife, or any allowance to be made to her,
and if any, the security to be given the same, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case may be
fit, equitable and just; but no alimony shall be granted to an
adulterous wife. In any award of permanent alimony the court
shall have jurisdiction to order periodic payments or payment
in a lump sum."

5. Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722, 7 So. 2d 9 (1942); Gross v. Gross, 154 Fla. 649.
18 So. 2d 538 (1944).
6. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2(1 281 (Fla. 1953); Allen v. Allen, Ill

Fla. 733, 150 So. 237 (1933).
7. Beidler v. Beidler, 43 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1949).
8. See Cowen v. Cowen, 95 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1957).
9.

Lee v. Lee, 157 Fla. 439, 26 So. 2d 177 (1946).

10. See Tenny v. Tenny, 147 Fla. 672, 3 So. 2d 375 (1941). The power has
been implied from §65.16, Lopez v. Avery, 66 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1953), as well as
from §65.14, Bezanilla v. Bezanilla, 65 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1953).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss4/2
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Citing section 65.08 a federal court said:"[W]hile it is true that under the Florida law the courts of
Florida will usually recognize and adopt the parties' agreements, if free from fraud or if they appear to be fair under all
the circumstances, yet the court does have the power and duty
to approve or disapprove the agreement, and is not bound to
accept the stipulations of the parties."
Thus an agreement by the wife not to ask for alimony will have no
legal force if the court feels that the circumstances of the case dictate
otherwise.
Effect of Omitting the Agreement from the Decree
The customary procedure is to incorporate the agreement, at least
by reference, into the divorce decree. In all the cases seeking modification the decree did refer to the agreement. However, section 65.15
provides for modification of "any agreement . . . for . . . separate

support, maintenance or alimony... whether in connection with any
action for divorce or separate maintenance, or with any voluntary
property settlement." It can be argued that section 65.15 is not intended to cover an agreement unless incorporated into a decree because the Florida Supreme Court stated, "We have authority under
. . . section 65.15 . . . to modify alimony allowances, whether based

on stipulation and decree or upon decree that rests solely on testimony." 2 However, this appears to be loose language. There is no
valid reason to assume that the power of the courts depends on
whether the agreement is incorporated into or omitted from the decree, although the absence of case authority makes any conclusion
somewhat speculative. The statute seems clearly applicable to unincorporated alimony type agreements and there are indications to
that effect. "Provisions of separation agreements or final decrees
fixing the amount of support or alimony . . . may be modified
... Moreover, the preamble says the act is to allow modification of
"payments... in accordance with voluntary agreements between husband and wife, or pursuant to decree of court .... " Likewise, it may
be assumed that the law is the same as to property settlements; omitting the property settlement from the decree should not affect whether
it is modifiable.

11.

Florida National Bank 8: Trust Co. at Miami v. United States, 182 F. Supp.

76, 80 (S.D. Fla. 1960).

12. Fowler v. Fowler, 159 Fla. 100, 31 So. 2d 162 (1947).
13. Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639, 642 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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Reservation of Jurisdiction

The general rule in American law is that a court cannot subsequently alter a final divorce decree without a reservation of such
power or without statutory authority. 4 Such statutory authority was
granted by the Florida legislature in 1935. Section 65.15 "provides
for the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court to modify the alimony
or support money aspects of such an agreement as the circumstances
might justify .... It is immaterial whether the chancellor specifically

reserves jurisdiction to modify."' 5 "[Tihe cited statute by its own force
reserves the jurisdiction of the trial court to modify the alimony
aspects of the decree upon a proper showing in the future."'16 If alimony was awarded in the first instance, either by agreement or decree,
the only requirement is that the defendant, even a non-resident, be
given an opportunity to be heard." However, if retention of the
power to award alimony is desired, caution suggests that jurisdiction
be specifically reserved, because, unless the court reserves jurisdiction,
a wife that does not obtain alimony when the divorce is granted,
cannot obtain it later. This is so whether the request for alimony is
omitted' 8 or denied.'1
POWER AS DEPENDENT ON THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

A distinction early arose between property settlements, including
those expressly stated to be in lieu of alimony, and support agreements. Within the area of property settlements, two conflicting lines
of cases exist. One holds the statute inapplicable to property settlements; the other would allow modification under special circumstances.
The first line of cases began with Dix v. Dix.20 The agreement,
incorporated into the divorce decree, recited that in exchange for
$5,000 the wife released her spouse from all claims. An attached
stipulation provided that the payment was "in lieu of . . . maintenance and support . . .and . .. alimony, and . .. dower." 2' After

receiving the $5,000, the wife sought modification asserting her
poverty and the wealth of her former husband. The bill was dismissed. The court held it was a fully executed property settlement,
14.
15.

2 VERN'R, A.IERICAN FA.rrL" LAWS §106 (1932).

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid.
Weiss v. Weiss, 118 So. 2d 833 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
Schiff v. Schiff, 123 So. 2d 295 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
140 Fla. 91, 191 So. 205 (1939).
Id. at 95, 191 So. at 206.

Kosch v. Kosch, 113 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1959).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss4/2
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and therefore was not within the statute even though it was expressly
stated to be in lieu of alimony. Two cases 22 followed the Dix rationale and held that section 65.15 is inapplicable to fully executed property settlements, and that the validity of such agreements is tested
by the same standards as other contracts.
The second line of cases is exemplified by Vance v. Vance. 23 According to the agreement the husband was to pay $100 a month to
the wife for six years and maintain an insurance policy for the wife,
personal property was divided, and the wife relinquished her right
of dower and the statutory right to share in her spouse's estate. The
husband sought modification when his former wife remarried. The
24
court held it was a property settlement and was within the statute,
with Dix not cited. But the court said that since the agreement was
intended to be final and was not unfair or overreaching, the husband
could not obtain a modification merely because the wife remarried.
"When a property settlement provides for an agreed sum or sums to
be paid the wife in lieu of her right to participate in her husband's
property, it will take a very strong case, even in view of

.

. . [section

65.15] to modify it."25 Several cases have agreed that section 65.15
applies to property settlements, 26 but only one has found the situation
27
before it the "strong" case required by Vance.
22. Fowler v. Fowler, 112 So. 2d 411, 414 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959), held that
"Property settlement agreements are no different from other agreements in their
legal aspects and are therefore binding when shown to be fair and regular." See
Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1954).
23. 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128 (1940).
24. "They [property settlements] may be modified in the manner and for the
reasons shown as authorized by [§65.15] .....
Id. at 517, 197 So. at 130.
25. Id. at 517, 197 So. at 130.
26. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953), held that although
the statute applied, the husband had not shown the needed change of circumstances
required to modify the property settlement involved: "A very strong case is required"; Norton v. Norton, 131 Fla. 219, 179 So. 414 (1938), held that even though
the statute applied, the wife was estopped to maintain the statutory proceeding
to modify once she accepted the money and property the husband was required
to convey under the agreement. The estoppel concept advanced in the Norton case
appears to have been the initial attempt by the Florida courts to prevent modification of property settlements; no subsequent case has rested its holding on the
estoppel basis. And in fact the case of Cohn v. Mann, 38 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1949),
is apparently contra to Norton. For there the court made no mention of the
husband being estopped after accepting full performance by the wife, although
logically such a holding appears compelled if Norton is followed and if the agreement in Cohn v. Mann is considered a property agreement.
27. Cohn v. Mann, 38 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1949). There an agreement was incorporated into a decree in which the husband was to obtain full title to the
house and was to pay the wife $75 per week. The wife did convey full title to the
husband, and the husband then petitioned to lessen the $75 per week, saying he
could not afford to pay it. The court reversed a dismissal of the application to

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
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Without admitting that these two divergent lines of cases existed,
several recent Florida cases have begun to evolve a commendable
compromise approach. They attempt to break down the various
aspects of the settlement agreements, considering the property aspect
as unmodifiable and not within the statute and the alimony or support aspect modifiable. For example, in Fowler v. Fowler2s a separation agreement divided the property of the parties, specified that
the wife was to receive alimony, and required the husband to maintain a life insurance policy for the wife's benefit. The husband applied for modification but the Florida Supreme Court denied his
petition. The court initially held that the husband had the duty to
maintain the insurance policy for the wife's benefit because it "was
part of the property settlement and is not subject to modification ...
under F.S. section 65.15, F.S.A. ' ' 29 Then the court found that
although the alimony aspect of the agreement was modifiable, the
circumstances shown by the husband did not justify such modification.
More explicitly in Kroll v. Kroll, the court said that the statute
gives the power "to modify property settlement agreements or final decrees but extends only to provisions for support, maintenance and alimony." 30 This appears to be a sound view, considering the language of
the statute: "agreements . . . for ... alimony, whether in connection
with any . . . property settlements." The court considered the agree-

ment to be entirely a property settlement, and said it should not be
disturbed except upon proof that would justify modification or can81
cellation between strangers.
modify, followed Vance that §65.15 applied, indicated this was an instance of
the strong case required by that decision, and said that the husband's "petition
was not without equity." It may however be possible to distinguish the case; for
while both the wife and the divorcing court appear in the statement of the case
to have called the stipulation a "property settlement," the court at one point
does call the $75 a "payment of alimony." If it is taken as such, the case does not
present difficulty since alimony payments are clearly modifiable under §6535.
28. 112 So. 2d 411 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
29. Id. at 414.
30. 105 So. 2d 495 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
31. Note should be taken however of Hunter v. Hunter, 108 So. 2d 478
(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959), a case in which the idea advanced in Kroll would appear to
be well suited for application. There a stipulation between the parties, which
had been approved in the final decree, specified that the husband deed the home
and give the personal property to the wife, make mortgage payments on the
house, pay $200 a month alimony until the death of either or the remarriage of
the wife, and pay the wife's income taxes. The court said that it was a "close
question" but held that the stipulation was "essentially" an agreement to pay
stated sums at certain intervals in lieu of alimony rather than a property settlement; thus it could be modified under §65.16. However since the wife only sought
an increase in alimony in Hunter, the case can be interpreted as in harmony with
Kroll. For the difficulty arises not from the result but from the language used.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss4/2
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Although it is unclear whether a property agreement is within
section 65.15, in practical terms it is almost immaterial since the courts
have shown little disposition to modify except to the extent that any
contract can be modified, that is, for fraud or the like. There has
been a recent tendency to break down settlement agreements and consider the property aspect unmodifiable and the alimony aspect
modifiable. With a single exception, 32 the courts appear to be giving
little weight to the statutory words "in lieu of alimony" in deciding
if a settlement agreement is essentially one of property or alimony;
even if the agreement specifies it is in lieu of alimony, it may still
be held to be an unmodifiable property settlement.
It may further be theorized that the two apparently divergent
lines of cases dealing with whether property settlements are within
section 65.15 are not actually inconsistent. In those cases holding
property settlements not within the statute, conclusiveness and finality
of the agreement have been based upon the fact that the property
agreement has been fully executed. 33 Whereas, in all but one of the
cases holding property settlements within section 65.15, the property
settlement was not fully executed at the time of the suit. The sole
exception is an early case under the statute that experimented with an
estoppel concept no longer used by the courts in this area of the law.34
Although the courts do not recognize the fact of conflicting language
in the cases, much less attempt to distinguish the two sets of cases on
the completeness of execution, it would appear to be an acceptable
3
5
recourse to avoid overruling. One case has strongly hinted at it.
If this view should be taken as the law, then fully executed property
settlements would not be within section 65.15, and therefore are unmodifiable; property settlements not yet fully executed would be
within section 65.15, but would require a "strong" case for modification.36
If, on the other hand, an agreement is deemed to be "alimony," the
chancellor has great discretion in passing upon application for modification. 37 "As to the provisions for alimony and support, if changing
circumstances cause them to become too much or too little, necessary
namely that the entire stipulation is said to be essentially in lieu of alimony,
rather than an agreement having both (modifiable) alimony and (unmodifiable),
property aspects.
32. Hunter v. Hunter, 108 So. 2d 478 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
33. Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1954); Dix v. Dix, 140 Fla. 91, 191
So. 205 (1939).
34. Norton v. Norton, supra note 26.
35. Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1954).
36. Caveat: child support agreements. Brown v. Brown, 123 So. 2d 298 (3rd
D.C.A. Fla. 1960). Such parts of property settlements as relate to custody and welfare of children are always modifiable.
37. E.g., Blanton v. Blanton, 154 Fla. 750, 18 So. 2d 902 (1944).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 2

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

relief may be gained under section 65.15, F.S.A., for modification of
such decrees."''a It will be more difficult to obtain a change where
the decree adopted a previous agreement of the parties because "where
the amount of alimony decreed is based upon an agreement freely
entered into between the parties, a heavier burden rests upon the husband to justify a modification." 31 And it has been held inSedell v. Sedell that only the "strongest and most compelling reasons" will permit
a husband to obtain a modification when the wife has released special
equities in the property of the husband in return for a specified
40
amount.
At one time it appeared that a divorce decree, incorporating a
property settlement, might still later be modified so as to provide for
alimony, even if the property settlement itself were unmodifiable.
Such a result of course would upset any hope for a stable and final
agreement between the parties. In Haynes v. Haynes,4 1 there was a
stipulation between the parties covering custody of the children, real
estate, the wife's income tax and attorney's fees, an automobile, and a
legacy payable to both under the will of the husband's father. In the
stipulation the wife agreed not to ask for alimony and the divorce
court incorporated the stipulation into the decree. Later, however, the
wife moved for a modification, alleging that her earnings had decreased while her former husband's had increased. The lower court
dismissed, holding section 65.15 inapplicable. The supreme court
remanded on this point holding the statute applicable. An attorne
then would have had to advise his client that modification would be
possible, even if the stipulation covered only property rights and
not alimony, and even if the wife had agreed to forgo alimony.
In 1954, the same parties again appeared before the court.4 2 The
wife cited the earlier case as authority for her being able to obtain
38. Lauderdale v. Lauderdale, 96 So. 2d 663, 665 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
39. Fowler v. Fowler, 112 So. 2d 411, 414 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
40. 100 So. 2d 639, 642 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1958). In the case the husband wa,

paying alimony, child support, and the premiums on a life insurance policy for
the benefit of the wife. The husband asked for a modification so as to make the
children the beneficiaries of the policy. The court refused, saying that the wife
gave up special equities in the husband's property in return for obtaining a vested
interest in the policy. However the effect which the relinquishment of special
equities in the property of the husband by the wife may have on an alimony
modification may be questionable. For here the petition only asked for a modification of the insurance aspect of the agreement, and it appears that an agreement
to maintain a life insurance policy is a property settlement and not alimony.
Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128 (1940). If so, the court in Sedell has not
made any significant departure from the language used by the Vance line of cases
in describing the power to modify property settlements.
41. 40 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1949).
42. Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1954).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss4/2
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alimony. The supreme court rejected this contention, saying that the
holding in the first case rested on the fact that some of the legacies
covered in the stipulation had not been paid at that time. The court
noted that the legacies had now been fully paid and no modification
was possible if the agreement was fair and regular, thus resolving the
potential difficulty the first Haynes case presented.
It should, however, be noted that the first Haynes case still stands
for the propositions that a property settlement not fully executed
is still modifiable and that an agreement by the wife not to ask for
alimony will have little or no legal effect in itself. For the wife to be
barred from later obtaining alimony she must be barred even in the
43
absence of such a promise on her part.
ALIMONY OR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT

If the parties desire an unmodifiable agreement, it is crucial that
it be classed as a "property settlement" under Florida law. Even if
it cannot be fully executed at the immediate time, the rare "very
strong case" will be required to obtain a modification. Perhaps the
most typical situation would be when a promising executive with
few present assets desires to obtain a binding settlement and not have
the fear haunting him that future success may be diminished by increased payments to the wife. His success may indirectly convincethe court that circumstances have sufficiently changed and that his
former wife should be awarded a large part of his future estate or
earnings.
When a lump sum settlement cannot be effected, one possibility
appears to deserve serious consideration. In Underwood v. Underwood" the agreement, substantially incorporated into the divorce
decree, related that the monthly payments were "as and for alimony and in full and complete satisfaction of the husband's obligation to maintain and support the wife." It also provided
that the husband was to continue payments for the period of the life
of the wife, irrespective of remarriage or the husband's death. The
agreement provided for a lien on the husband's estate. The court
held that this was a property settlement and as such "should be

43. But cf. Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722, 7 So. 2d 9 (1942), where the wife
agreed not to ask for alimony in the divorce and did not. The court refused her
later petition for alimony. It would seem, however, that the decision impliedly
rests upon the rule that, unless jurisdiction is reserved, a wife cannot obtain
alimony subsequent to the divorce unless she was awarded alimony in the divorce
itself. In Weiss v. Weiss, 118 So. 2d 833 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960), the fact that the wife
had agreed not to ask for alimony was not stressed.
44. 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953).
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construed as other contracts."' 15 The principal factor in the refusal
to excuse the husband from further payments after the wife's remarriage was that the agreement clearly called for continuance of the
payments for the life of the wife, although certain equities favoring
the wife were noted. The court said it was to look to substance, and
the use of the world "alimony" was not conclusive. "Where periodic
payments are to be made the wife for the period of her life and is not
limited to the joint lives of the parties, the legal effect of such payments are that they constitute property settlements and not alimony.
By its very nature, alimony is limited to the lifetime of the husband. ' ' 4 6
The court concluded that the husband's right to modify was controlled by the Vance case,47 and that the husband had not shown the
needed change of circumstances: "a very strong case is required."
In Underwood the wife had substantial equity in the husband's
property. The wife had apparently been very active in the husband's
jewelry business, participating in almost every facet of its management. The court could have found that the payments were in settlement of her equity, and based its decision thereon. What influence
this factor had on the court is not certain, but it was not controlling
or even emphasized. However, a settlement arising from a situation
in which the wife has less equity in the husband's property may be
more vulnerable to a modification. Nevertheless, it is suggested that
a reasonably unmodifiable property settlement can be obtained b)
providing that the payments be made for the life of the wife, or bmaking any other substantial deviation from the nature of alimony,
for example, payments for a specified number of years. Although there
was also a substantial property element in Underwood, the court
clearly did not emphasize or rest on it. It appears safe to advise that
when the payments are for the life of the wife this alone will be
enough to classify the agreement as a property settlement under
Florida law.

45. Id. at 287. The Underwood type agreement should be considered from
the tax viewpoint. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§71, 215; Treas. Reg.
§1.71 (a) (4); Soltermann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959); Rev. Rul.
58-192, 1958-1 Cui. BULL. 34.
46. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281, 288 (Fla. 1953).
47. 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128 (1940). It will be recalled that in Vance the

monthly payments were to continue for six years. There the court foreshadowed
Underwood by hinting that termination on remarriage was part of the nature of

alimony. "When there is no property settlement ...

remarriage . . . will generally

relieve the former husband from the payment of alimony but where a property
settlement was in good faith entered into by the parties and it is shown that it was
intended as a release of all claims of each against the other, including that for ali-

mony, and one or both . . . have acted in reliance .

.

. it should not be disturbed

merely because one of the parties remarried." Id. at 517, 197 So. at 130.
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SUMMARY

Section 65.15 of Florida Statutes 1961 will permit modification of
an agreement, or such parts of an agreement as are in the nature of
alimony at any time. Fully executed property settlements can probably be considered unmodifiable; unexecuted property settlements are
modifiable in the rare "very strong case." It will not matter whether
the separation agreement is incorporated into or omitted from the
divorce decree. Any agreement prescribing payments that substantially
deviate from the nature of alimony can probably be classified as a
property settlement.
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